随着我国老龄化进程的加速,失能、半失能人群规模扩大,长期护理需求急剧增长。长护险制度自2016年开展试点工作以来,已覆盖全国49个试点城市。针对长护险制度试点中不同群体的利益博弈问题,本文基于演化博弈理论构建地方政府和长护险服务机构演化博弈模型,研究长护险服务机构和政府策略选择的演化过程,分析双方的演化稳定策略,并在此基础上进行仿真模拟。研究表明,长护险服务机构的寻租行为、政府的政策调整和惩罚等会影响服务机构和政府的策略选择,双方应尽快健全约束机制,建立平等互利的良性关系。因此,本文建议政府优化政策内容、把握监管力度、完善制度体系建设,促进长护险服务机构与政府间的积极合作,推动长护险制度不断完善。

With the acceleration of aging in China, the scale of disabled and semi-disabled people has expanded, and the demand for long-term care has sharply increased. The long-term care insurance system has covered 49 pilot cities in China since pilots were launched in 2016. In view of the interest game between different groups in the pilot of long-term care insurance system, an evolutionary game model of local government and long-term care insurance service institutions was constructed based on evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary process of the strategy selection of long-term care insurance service institutions and the government was studied, and the evolutionary stability strategies of both parties were analyzed. On this basis, the simulation results showed that rent-seeking behavior of long-term care insurance service institutions, government policy adjustment and punishment will affect the strategic choices of long-term care insurance service institutions and the government. Both sides should improve the constraint mechanism as soon as possible, establish a benign relationship of equality and mutual benefit. Therefore, we suggest that the government optimize policy content, enhance the regulation, improve construction of institutional system, promote active cooperation between long-term care insurance service institutions and the government, and promote the continuous improvement of the long-term care insurance system.