Policy Effects and Optimization Pathways of the Direct Distribution Reform of Maternity Allowances

China Health Insurance ›› 2026, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (8) : 16-23.

China Health Insurance ›› 2026, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (8) : 16-23. DOI: 10.19546/j.issn.1674-3830.2026.8.002
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Policy Effects and Optimization Pathways of the Direct Distribution Reform of Maternity Allowances

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Abstract

Objective: In 2026, China fully implemented the nationwide reform of direct maternity allowances distribution, shifting the distribution mechanism from “employer intermediation” to “direct payment to individuals”. This paper aims to evaluate the policy effects of the direct distribution reform, identify the remaining governance blind spots after the reform, and provide references for improving the maternity allowances distribution mechanism. Methods: Using the principal-agent theory as the analytical framework, and based on the 2025 national medical insurance audit data and semi-structured interviews with 11 participants, this paper focuses on the distribution of allowances to examine the dilemma mechanism of the indirect distribution mode, the institutional effects of the direct distribution reform, and the remaining governance blind spots after the reform. Results: The institutional defect of indirect maternity allowances distribution lies in that employers hold both information advantages and the right to intermediate the funds. Their dual identity as “employer” and “intermediate disburser” endows them with discretionary power in the allowance transfer process, which induces a progressive behavioral chain of “information concealment—fund interception—rights and interests encroachment” under interest conflicts and collusion incentives. The direct distribution reform effectively reduces the room for interception and misappropriation by cutting off the intermediate fund link and reconstructing the information structure, and weakens the economic incentive for collusion and insurance fraud by reconfiguring the control right of funds. However, after the reform, the risk of collusion and insurance fraud has transformed in form, delayed fund distribution still remains constrained by administrative coordination efficiency, and the structural transfer of information asymmetry cannot be ignored. Conclusions: The governance logic after the direct distribution reform should shift from “fund control” to equal emphasis on “information regulation and process reengineering”. A collaborative governance path covering collusion prevention at the declaration end, improvement of administrative efficiency, and expansion of terminal social supervision should be constructed.

Key words

maternity allowances direct distribution reform / principal-agent theory / the right to intermediate the funds / information asymmetry / collaborative governance

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Policy Effects and Optimization Pathways of the Direct Distribution Reform of Maternity Allowances[J]. China Health Insurance. 2026, 0(8): 16-23 https://doi.org/10.19546/j.issn.1674-3830.2026.8.002

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