From "Three-End Dysfunction" to "Systemic Reconstruction": A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Dilemma of Basic Medical Insurance Fund Recovery in Third-Party Tort Cases

China Health Insurance ›› 2026, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7) : 29-36.

China Health Insurance ›› 2026, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (7) : 29-36. DOI: 10.19546/j.issn.1674-3830.2026.7.004
Observation & Discussion

From "Three-End Dysfunction" to "Systemic Reconstruction": A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Dilemma of Basic Medical Insurance Fund Recovery in Third-Party Tort Cases

Author information +
History +

Abstract

A critical practical challenge in the operation of medical insurance is the difficulty in recovering advanced payments from tortfeasors in third-party tort cases. From a jurisprudential perspective, this paper analyzes the causes of this dilemma across three dimensions: social perceptions, systemic coordination, and institutional operation. The failue of recovery is not a problem of a single link, but the result of a triple overlap: the weakening of the insured's duty to disclose, the dormancy of the advance payment system, and the ineffectiveness of administrative recovery. At the root of the problem lies the public's insufficient awareness of the “social risk-sharing” nature of the medical insurance fund, the lack of effective information exchange mechanisms between judicial authorities and healthcare security administrations, and the disconnect between rule design and the realities of medical treatment and litigation. To solve this dilemma, it is necessary to promote a shift in public perception from individual welfare to social risk-sharing, establish a collaborative working mechanism among courts, procuratorates, and healthcare security administrations, remove blockages in information sharing and procedural coordination, and improve internal closed-loop management of recovery along with supporting measures such as credit sanctions. The effective realization of the medical insurance fund's right of recovery depends on bridging the gap between “law in books” and “law in action”.

Key words

medical insurance fund subrogation / third-party torts / jurisprudence / collaborative mechanism

Cite this article

Download Citations
From "Three-End Dysfunction" to "Systemic Reconstruction": A Jurisprudential Analysis of the Dilemma of Basic Medical Insurance Fund Recovery in Third-Party Tort Cases[J]. China Health Insurance. 2026, 0(7): 29-36 https://doi.org/10.19546/j.issn.1674-3830.2026.7.004

References

[1] 郑功成. 从政策性文件主导走向法治化:中国特色医疗保障制度建设的必由之路[J].学术研究,2021(06):80-88.
[2] 赵晨熙.健全基金监管长效制度守牢群众“救命钱”——各级医保部门5年追回医保资金1200亿元[EB/OL].(2025-12-19)[2026-05-17].https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/e0B2oxf4ImMwu6CCaD1VXA.
[3] 吕国营. 基本医疗保险实质上就是大病基本医疗保险[J].中国医疗保险,2013(08):43-44.
[4] 刘思达. 法社会学信札[M].北京:北京大学出版社:2024.
[5] 杨锦刚. 医保基金先行支付与追偿途径的思考[J].四川劳动保障,2019(08):25.
[6] 吴为民. 医保基金代位求偿制度的法理探讨与完善建议——以交通事故第三人侵权案件为例[J].中国医疗保险,2023(12):72-76.
[7] 南之湄. 第三人侵权纠纷中医保基金先行支付的困境与出路——基于法理与实践的双重考察[J].中国医疗保险,2025(08):53-59.
[8] 检察日报.重庆酉阳:从办理具体案件到推动建立协作机制——不让医保基金“跑冒滴漏”[EB/OL].(2025-09-17)[2026-05-17].https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/K10vBx3-fJ5SvTAKuc6-nQ.
[9] 张景卫. 医保基金先行支付医疗费的侵权纠纷处理路径探析[J].法律适用,2019(16):91-98.
[10] 王虎学. 个人与社会何以维系——基于涂尔干《社会分工论》的思考[J].江海学刊,2015(02):55-61.
[11] 高春芽. 集体行动的逻辑及其困境[J].武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版),2008(01):12-16.
[12] 高鸿钧. 卢曼的系统论法学及其法律系统[J].清华法治论衡,2023(00):7-15.
[13] 汪棋佩. 第三人侵权与医保报销的行民交叉问题探究[J].中国公共法律服务,2024(03):185-190.
[14] 庞德. 通过法律的社会控制[M].沈宗灵,译.北京:商务印书馆,2010:55-85.
[15] 夏磊,丁丽.第三人侵权时医保基金先行支付相关问题探究[J].现代医学,2023,51(S1):56-61.
[16] 张艳. 我国第三人撤销之诉制度在司法实践中出现的问题与完善对策——以法院已受理的案件为样本的分析[J].政治与法律,2014(06):152-161.

Accesses

Citation

Detail

Sections
Recommended

/

〈 〉