Focusing on the infringement of public health interests caused by excessive medical treatment and the limitations of traditional relief mechanisms, this paper takes civil public interest litigation as the institutional entry point to analyze the current situation of regulation of excessive medical treatment cases in China. It is found that there are difficulties such as limited administrative supervision and punishment, heavy burden of proof for patients, and insufficient existing practical cases. The study systematically proves the legitimacy and necessity of civil public interest litigation in the field of excessive medical care from the dimensions of institutional advantages, legal basis, and normative basis, and proposes a comprehensive path that combines theoretical logic and practical operability. It is necessary to clarify the connection logic between administrative supervision and civil public interest litigation at the legal level, as well as to construct a more implementable rule system at the institutional level, including refined definition of excessive medical care, specialized collection of relevant evidence, and compensation distribution that balances public and private interests. This paper provides theoretical reference and practical guidance for the handling of similar cases of excessive medical care, and helps to improve and develop prosecutorial public interest litigation in emerging medical consumption fields.
Key words
excessive medical treatment /
civil public interest litigation /
procuratorial authorities /
social public interest /
punitive damages
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