In view of the DRG payment reform pilots carried out by the National Healthcare Security Administration in recent years, this paper analyzes the incentive issues in the DRG reform based on theoretical analysis and qualitative interviews in eight pilot areas. In theory, under the standard of "average payment", medical service providers have the motivation to reduce the treatment cost of each patient, increase the number of inpatients, and obtain higher income from each patient. However, these changes may be based on the shift of patients, decomposition of hospitalization, etc., which is uncertain to improve hospital service efficiency and medical quality. Qualitative research shows that different stakeholders have different incentive reactions in the DRG reform. In order to prevent the incentive results from deviating from the policy expectations, this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations.
Key words
DRG reform /
ruler competition /
incentive distortion
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