Research on Principal-agent Problems and Optimization Under the Background of Centralizing Fund Management of Basic Medical Insurance

doi:10.19546/j.issn.1674-3830.2023.1.005

China Health Insurance ›› 2023, Vol. 0 ›› Issue (1) : 30-37. DOI: 10.19546/j.issn.1674-3830.2023.1.005

Author information +

History +

Abstract

Based on the framework of principal-agent theory, this paper discussed the lower-level government’s behavior logic of deregulation under the background of centralizing fund management of basic medical insurance with the risk transfer contract model and ratchet effect model to propose corresponding improvement paths from the perspective of incentive and supervision. The paper found that separating the financial and administrative powers would lead to the relaxation of the fund supervision by lower-level governments and put forward suggestions for improvement from the perspective of governance mode, fund management mode, and medical and health system reform.

Key words

agency costs / moral hazard / principal-agent theory / improvement of planning level

Cite this article

EndNote

Ris (Procite)

Bibtex

Download Citations

Research on Principal-agent Problems and Optimization Under the Background of Centralizing Fund Management of Basic Medical Insurance[J]. China Health Insurance. 2023, 0(1): 30-37 https://doi.org/10.19546/j.issn.1674-3830.2023.1.005

References

[1] 封进,王贞.延迟退休年龄对城镇职工医保基金平衡的影响——基于政策模拟的研究[J].社会保障评论,2019,3(02):109-121.
[2] 付明卫,王普鹤,赵嘉珩,等.市级统筹、制度设计与医保控费[J].产业经济评论,2020(06):53-69.
[3] 刘勇政,贾俊雪,丁思莹.地方财政治理:授人以鱼还是授人以渔——基于省直管县财政体制改革的研究[J].中国社会科学,2019(07):43-63+205.
[4] 鲁全. 中国医疗保险管理体制变革研究:府际关系的视角[J]. 中国行政管理, 2022.
[5] 王宗凡. 医保统筹层次并非越高越好[J].中国社会保障,2019(04):84.
[6] 吴菁,李锐,鲁佳倩.基本医保均等化能缩小健康差距吗?——来自职工医保省级统筹的证据[J].中国医疗保险,2022(08).
[7] 张维迎. 博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海三联书店. 上海人民出版社, 1996, 19.
[8] 郑功成. 奋力实现“十四五”时期医保制度基本成熟[J].中国医疗保险,2021(03):10-12.
[9] 朱恒鹏. 城乡居民基本医疗保险制度整合状况初步评估[J].中国医疗保险,2018 (02):8-12.
[10] 朱恒鹏,岳阳,林振翮.统筹层次提高如何影响社保基金收支——委托—代理视角下的经验证据[J].经济研究,2020,55(11):101-120.
[11] HOLMSTROM B.Moral hazard and observability[J]. The Bell Journal of Economics, 1979: 74-91.
[12] LAZEAR E P, ROSEN S.Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1981, 89(5): 841-864.
[13] MALCOMSON J M.Work incentives, hierarchy, and internal labor markets[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1984, 92(3): 486-507.
[14] ROSS S A.The economic theory of agency: The principal's problem[J]. The American Economic Review, 1973, 63(2): 134-139.
[15] WILSON J A, YOFFE A D.The transition metal dichalcogenides discussion and interpretation of the observed optical, electrical and structural properties[J]. Advances in Physics, 1969, 18(73): 193-335.